Suchergebnisse

Hercules, Leviathan or Promotheus? -- Knowledge, competition or dialogue? -- Hazardous decisions -- The UK: Political control with the benefits of judicial authority? -- The Netherlands: participation through the court system -- Canada: Community-based siting -- Comparison of case studies -- Summary and conclusions.

States have been widely criticized for failing to advance the international climate regime. Many observers now believe that a "new" climate governance is emerging through transnational and/or local forms of action that will eventually plug the resulting governance gaps. Yet states, which remain oddly absent from most discussions of the "new" governance, will remain key players as governance becomes more polycentric. This paper introduces a special issue that explores the ability of states to rise to these interconnected challenges through the analytical prism of policy innovation. It reveals that policy innovation is much more multi-dimensional than is often thought; it encompasses three vital activities: invention (centering on the 'source' of new policy elements), diffusion (that produces different 'patterns' of policy adoption), and the evaluation of the 'effects' that such innovations create in reality. The papers, which range from qualitative case studies to large '. n' quantitative studies, offer new insights into the varied roles that states play in relation to all three. They show, for instance that: the policy activity of states has risen dramatically in the past decade; that state innovation is affected to similar degrees by internal and external factors; and that policies that offer flexibility to target groups on how to meet policy goals are most effective but that voluntary reporting requirements are ineffective. This paper draws upon these and many other insights to offer a much more nuanced reflection on the future of climate governance; one that deservedly puts states at the front and center of analysis.

The governance of climate change is in flux. In the understandable rush to explore what is filling the governance gaps created by gridlock in the international regime, scholars risk under-appreciating the capacity of states to engage in policy innovation at national and sub-national levels. Based on a review of existing concepts and theoretical explanations for (in)action at this level, we make the case for adopting a more holistic approach to understanding policy innovation, covering the source of new policy elements ('invention'), their wider entry into use ('diffusion'), and their projected and/or real effects ('evaluation'). The analytical and methodological challenges that arise from integrating these three perspectives are systematically explored and integrated into a new analytical framework used in the other contributions to this volume to explore more fully the politics of invention, diffusion, and evaluation in specific areas of mitigation and adaptation policy.

Over the past decade, climate change adaptation has become an integral item on the climate policy agendas of several European countries. As such, researchers have begun to question what concrete changes in polices are occurring at national levels and what dynamics can explain these changes. While new laws, policies and institutions have been created to deliver adaptation, supported through processes of cross-national policy innovation and learning, another interesting observation being made is that adaptation is steadily emerging into a new separate and distinct policy field in a handful of countries. The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to empirically map where and to what degree adaptation is emerging as a policy field; second, to theoretically and empirically explore the drivers underpinning policy field emergence. Based upon a survey of leading adaptation policy makers in 27 European countries, we show that there are signs of adaptation becoming a policy field in 15 countries. Furthermore, we find that even though institutional change, coupled with increasing public attention and pressure on governments to react to climate change, has helped drive the emergence of adaptation as a policy field, it would appear that it is the activities of elite policy makers and experts that have had the most influence.

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS APPEAR AS A TYPE OF MAGIC CARPET FOR THE TRIP TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A PRE-FLIGHT CHECK OF THE CARPET'S VIABILITY, AND FINDS SEVERAL POTENTIAL DESIGN PROBLEMS. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN PRACTICE OFTEN DON'T COMPLY WITH THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC THEORY. FURTHER, THE DOMINATING NOTION OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS IS ONLY ONE OF MANY.

Scholars have tended to treat the European Union (EU) as an environmental 'leader'. Yet significant potential nonetheless exists for it to learn lessons in areas such as water policy where it has a long and successful history of involvement. The EU's Water Framework Directive (2000) imposes potentially far reaching requirements on its Member States to enhance public participation in the process of catchment management. However, to date, its implementation has been highly variable across and even within individual states. As the EU starts to revise the original Directive, thoughts will turn to how the current situation could be improved. One potentially productive avenue, which has not yet been fully explored, is to draw lessons on public participation from comparable multi-levelled governance contexts such as in the USA and Australia, where public engagement has arguably been more advanced. Drawing on theoretical accounts of the most likely facilitators and obstacles to lesson drawing, this paper assesses the scope for transfer. It finds that while the EU could potentially learn from these jurisdictions, there are likely to be significant obstacles in practice. These should be born in mind by would-be policy learners. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

IN ADDITION TO THE WELL-KNOWN PROGRAMME FOR FLOOD PROTECTION, DUTCH WATER POLICY CONSISTS OF TWO MAIN SUBSECTORS; WATER SUPPLY AND GROUND WATER PROTECTION, AND SURFACE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT. IN THIS CONTRIBUTION SPECIAL ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE CHARACTERISATION OF THESE SUBSECTORS USING TWO NETWORK VARIABLES; MUTUAL COMMITMENT AND INTERRELATEDNESS. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE OF THESE FEATURES AND THEIR RELATION WITH POLICY OPPORTUNITIES ARE EXAMINED, THE WATER SUPPLY SECTOR WAS AMALGATED INTO LARGER COMPANIES AND DEVELOPED MORE COOPERATION AS A RESULT OF THE PRESSURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE, WHICH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE PUMPING AND BILLING. THOUGH THE SECTOR IN A SENSE BECAME MORE INTEGRATED, THIS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASED NEED TO DO BUSINESS WITH OTHER INTERESTS, SUCH AS AGRICULTURE. THE SURFACE WATER QUALITY SUBSECTOR ALSO MOVED FROM A VERY INTEGRATED COMMUNITY INTO A MORE OPEN STRUCTURE. THIS OPENNESS IS, HOWEVER, TO A LARGE EXTENT ORGANIZED BY THE SECTOR ITSELF, BY INCORPORATING OTHER INTERESTS IN THEIR COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES. BOTH SUBSECTORS INCREASINGLY ADOPT A CONSENSUAL APPROACH IN DEALING WITH THESE OTHER INTERESTS.

Citizens' juries are a form of "minipublics," small-scale experiments with citizen participation in public decision-making. The article presents a theoretical argument that improves understanding relating to the design of the citizens' jury. We develop the claim that two discourses on democracy can be discerned: the deliberative and the pluralist. By looking at the design features of citizens' juries we conclude that they are based on pluralist reasoning to a far greater extent than most authors seem to realize, and that the association with deliberative democracy is therefore one-sided. Based on empirical findings, we attempt to shed further light on the actual operation of citizens' juries. Observations of two recent Dutch juries suggest on the one hand that a learning process and a positive effect on the sense of political involvement occurred. On the other hand, we saw a certain level of groupthink in one of the citizens' juries, and found that the juries are not greatly representative in terms of political preferences. Our findings point firstly to a need for greater awareness among the organizers of juries of the two democratic discourses. This would lead to more consistent jury design. Secondly, our research emphasizes the need for more hands-on critical research of minipublics. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2007.

The European Union (EU) has sought to lead the world in the adoption of ambitious climate change mitigation targets and policies. In an attempt to characterize and broadly explain the resulting pattern of EU climate governance, scholars have employed the term "multi-level reinforcement." This term does help to account for the paradoxical situation whereby the EU seeks to lead by example but is itself a relatively leaderless system of governance. Drawing on a much fuller empirical account of the evolution of EU climate governance, this article finds that the term captures some but not all aspects of the EU's approach. It identifies four other paradoxical features of the EU's approach and assesses the extent to which they exhibit "multi-level reinforcement." It concludes by looking forward and examining the extent to which all five features are expected to enable and/or constrain the EU's ability to maintain a leading position in climate governance. © 2012 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

What could happen to the Netherlands if, in 2030, the sea level starts to rise and eventually, after 100 years, a sea level of 5 m above current level would be reached? This question is addressed by studying literature, by interviewing experts in widely differing fields, and by holding an expert workshop on this question. Although most experts believe that geomorphology and current engineering skills would enable the country to largely maintain its territorial integrity, there are reasons to assume that this is not likely to happen. Social processes that precede important political decisions - such as the growth of the belief in the reality of sea level rise and the framing of such decisions in a proper political context (policy window) - evolve slowly. A flood disaster would speed up the decision-making process. The shared opinion of the experts surveyed is that eventually part of the Netherlands would be abandoned. © 2008 The Author(s).

The governance of climate adaptation involves the collective efforts of multiple societal actors to address problems, or to reap the benefits, associated with impacts of climate change. Governing involves the creation of institutions, rules and organizations, and the selection of normative principles to guide problem solution and institution building. We argue that actors involved in governing climate change adaptation, as climate change governance regimes evolve, inevitably must engage in making choices, for instance on problem definitions, jurisdictional levels, on modes of governance and policy instruments, and on the timing of interventions. Yet little is known about how and why these choices are made in practice, and how such choices affect the outcomes of our efforts to govern adaptation. In this introduction we review the current state of evidence and the specific contribution of the articles published in this Special Feature, which are aimed at bringing greater clarity in these matters, and thereby informing both governance theory and practice. Collectively, the contributing papers suggest that the way issues are defined has important consequences for the support for governance interventions, and their effectiveness. The articles suggest that currently the emphasis in adaptation governance is on the local and regional levels, while underscoring the benefits of interventions and governance at higher jurisdictional levels in terms of visioning and scaling-up effective approaches. The articles suggest that there is a central role of government agencies in leading governance interventions to address spillover effects, to provide public goods, and to promote the long-term perspectives for planning. They highlight the issue of justice in the governance of adaptation showing how governance measures have wide distributional consequences, including the potential to amplify existing inequalities, access to resources, or generating new injustices through distribution of risks. For several of these findings, future research directions are suggested.

Constraining global climate change to 1.5°C is commonly understood to require urgent and deep societal transformations. Yet such transformations are not always viewed as politically feasible; finding ways to enhance the political feasibility of ambitious decarbonization trajectories is needed. This paper reviews the role of social justice as an organizing principle for politically feasible 1.5°C transformations. A social justice lens usefully focuses attention on 1) protecting vulnerable people from climate change impacts, 2) protecting people from disruptions of transformation, and 3) enhancing the process of envisioning and implementing an equitable post-carbon society. However, justice-focused arguments could also have unintended consequences, such as being deployed against climate action. Hence proactively engaging with social justice is critical in navigating 1.5°C societal transformations.

Constraining global climate change to 1.5°C is commonly understood to require urgent and deep societal transformations. Yet such transformations are not always viewed as politically feasible; finding ways to enhance the political feasibility of ambitious decarbonization trajectories is needed. This paper reviews the role of social justice as an organizing principle for politically feasible 1.5°C transformations. A social justice lens usefully focuses attention on first, protecting vulnerable people from climate change impacts, second, protecting people from disruptions of transformation, and finally, enhancing the process of envisioning and implementing an equitable post-carbon society. However, justice-focused arguments could also have unintended consequences, such as being deployed against climate action. Hence proactively engaging with social justice is critical in navigating 1.5°C societal transformations.

Constraining global climate change to 1.5°C is commonly understood to require urgent and deep societal transformations. Yet such transformations are not always viewed as politically feasible; finding ways to enhance the political feasibility of ambitious decarbonization trajectories is needed. This paper reviews the role of social justice as an organizing principle for politically feasible 1.5°C transformations. A social justice lens usefully focuses attention on first, protecting vulnerable people from climate change impacts, second, protecting people from disruptions of transformation, and finally, enhancing the process of envisioning and implementing an equitable post-carbon society. However, justice-focused arguments could also have unintended consequences, such as being deployed against climate action. Hence proactively engaging with social justice is critical in navigating 1.5°C societal transformations.